Let The Fed be Fed
The US national debt has crossed $40 trillion, and the government is on track to spend more than $1 trillion this year just on interest. The question is no longer whether this matters. It is who will have the nerve to act when it does.
Rahul Saxena
9/25/20264 min read


A central bank that flinches can't fix a debt crisis
The US national debt has crossed $40 trillion, and the government is on track to spend more than $1 trillion this year just on interest. The question is no longer whether this matters. It is who will have the nerve to act when it does?That job falls to the Federal Reserve. The Fed has every right to intervene in the economy. But its decisions must be driven by economics, not by fear of angry politicians, election calendars, or market tantrums.When inflation calls for higher rates, the Fed should raise them without hesitation. Diplomacy has no place in monetary policy.
Bandages on a growing cancer
For two decades, Washington has treated every downturn with the same remedy: more borrowing, more bailouts, and cheaper money. Each round eased the pain for a while. None of them fixed the underlying disease.
This is the core warning of the Austrian School. Artificially cheap credit keeps weak firms alive and lets bad investments pile up. Every rescue postpones the correction and makes the final reckoning larger.The damage is also psychological. When markets constantly guess whether the Fed will bow to political pressure, price signals get muddied. Investors stop pricing risk and start pricing politics.
The pressure is only growing. More than $10 trillion of US debt matures in 2026 and must be refinanced at higher yields. Every politician with a stake in cheap borrowing now has a reason to lean on the Fed.
History shows what courage and cowardice cost
The US has run this experiment twice, with opposite results.
Take Arthur Burns first, the cautionary tale. In the early 1970s, President Nixon leaned on him to keep money loose ahead of the 1972 election, and Burns went along. The result was a decade of runaway inflation that peaked at about 13% by 1980, eating away at savings and wages across the country.
Then came Paul Volcker. Appointed in 1979, he pushed the federal funds rate to roughly 20%. Farmers blockaded the Fed with tractors. Builders mailed him lumber in protest. Congress threatened his job. He held firm anyway.The cure was painful, including a deep recession in 1981–82. But inflation fell to under 4% within a few years. That victory laid the foundation for two decades of stable growth.
The lesson is simple. A Fed that fears politicians produces inflation. A Fed that ignores them produces stability. Research across countries points the same way: more independent central banks tend to deliver lower, steadier inflation.
The debt trap: when deficits hold the Fed hostage
Economists have a name for today's biggest threat to Fed independence: fiscal dominance. It happens when government debt grows so large that the central bank feels forced to keep rates low just so the Treasury can afford its interest bill.
This is where deficits and monetary policy collide. Every rate hike now adds billions to federal interest costs. That gives Congress and the White House a powerful motive to pressure the Fed, and gives the Fed a tempting excuse to hold back.
If the Fed gives in, it stops fighting inflation and starts financing the government. That is how debt problems become currency problems. Quietly printing money to cover deficits is a hidden tax on every saver and wage earner.The way out is not a softer Fed. It is a Congress that stops running deficits that make hard monetary choices politically unbearable.
The case against, and why it falls short
Now, critics have fair points, and they deserve a real answer. They'll tell you the Fed has to care about jobs, too, and they're right. The Fed carries a dual mandate: stable prices and maximum employment. But weighing those two goals is an economic call. Sitting on your hands because an election is around the corner is not.
Others worry about handing so much power to unelected officials. Fair enough, and that's why the Fed chair has to sit in front of Congress and answer for every decision. But let politicians steer interest rates in the short run, and you get exactly what America got in the 1970s.
Then there's the charge that hard money causes recessions. Sometimes it does, and the pain is real. The alternative is worse, though: inflation that quietly eats your savings year after year, followed by an even nastier correction down the road.
And the big one: with $40 trillion in debt, can the country even afford higher rates? That's exactly the point. A Fed that bends to the debt makes the debt permanent. Fixing it is Congress's job, not the central bank's.
What needs to change
So what would it actually take? Discipline, on both sides of the ledger.It starts with letting the Fed act without fear. When the data say rates need to go up, they go up. No softening before elections, no sudden pivots to soothe jittery markets. It also means ending the bailout reflex, so failing firms and overextended lenders live with the consequences of their own bets.
Congress has to do its part, too, and that means stopping the bleeding before anyone talks about paying down the debt. Promising to repay $40 trillion means nothing while trillions more pile on every year. And the Fed should never be expected to hold rates down just to make the Treasury's interest bill easier to swallow.
Volcker proved that a central bank with nerve can break even the worst inflation. The US needs that nerve again, and a Congress willing to stop feeding the problem. Short-term pain is the price of avoiding a far larger crisis later.
References: U.S. Treasury debt metrics ($40 trillion national debt and 2026 debt maturities); historical Federal Reserve case studies (Arthur Burns and Paul Volcker); and Austrian School economic theory on credit and monetary policy.
